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California’s SB 1437 and Its Applicability to Attempted Murder 
Liability 
VIOLETA ALVAREZ  
Introduction 
 “It is a bedrock principle of the law and of equity that a person 
should be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own 
level of individual culpability.”1  With this in mind, it is reasonable to 
expect a harsher punishment for someone who is the principal in 
causing a death versus someone else who is not the principal actor.  
Similarly, one would expect a harsher punishment for completed acts, 
such as murder, than those that were mere attempts.  However, this 
has not always been the case.  Historically, California’s felony murder 
laws permitted an accomplice to be convicted of murder without 
actually being the person who directly caused death, regardless of 
whether they shared the intent to harm or kill.2  The bedrock principle 
that punishment must be meted out according to one’s level of 
individual culpability is at the core of the California Legislature’s 
recent reforms to certain types of murder convictions.3  
 Under California’s Senate Bill 1437 (“SB 1437”), the felony 
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it 
relates to murder, were amended “to ensure that murder liability is not 
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the 
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony 
                                                
1 Cal. S. 1437, 1015 § 1(d) (2018).  
2 See Cal. S. 1437, 1015 Legislative Counsel Digest (2018) (“this bill would require 
a principal in a crime to act with malice aforethought to be convicted of murder 
except when the person was a participant in the perpetration or attempted 
perpetration of a specified felony in which a death occurred, and the person was the 
actual killer…this bill would prohibit a participant in the perpetration or attempted 
perpetration of one of the specified first-degree murder felonies in which a death 
occurs from being liable for murder, unless the person was the actual killer or the 
person was not the actual killer...”). 
3 Cal. S. 1437, supra note 1. 
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who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”4  Advocates for 
this reform argue that this doctrine has allowed prosecutors to have a 
controlling bargaining chip in persuading defendants to agree to plea 
bargains in attempted homicide cases, even when they lacked any 
intent to harm someone.5  With these changes, made effective January 
1, 2019, people who were convicted under the felony murder rule or 
the natural and probable consequences theory but were not the 
principal actor can petition the court to have their conviction vacated 
and to be resentenced.6  Yet, SB 1437 makes no mention of its 
applicability to those who were convicted of attempted murder under 
the natural and probable consequences theory.  Given that attempted 
murder is a lesser crime than murder, it is reasonable to infer that SB 
1437 applies to the former as well as the latter.  If not, individuals 
convicted for an attempted murder under the ‘natural and probable 
consequences’ doctrine would be punished more harshly than those 
whose actions actually caused the death of another, violating the very 
bedrock principles upon which the reforms were made.  Simply put, if 
SB 1437 does not apply to attempted murder, there is an incentive to 
ensure the victim dies.  Meaning, SB 1437 incentivizes murder.   
 The question of SB 1437’s applicability to attempted murder 
liability has been challenged in various Courts of Appeal, and in late 
2019, the California Supreme Court granted review.7  In this Note, I 
argue that SB 1437 encompasses or should extend to those convicted 
of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences 
                                                
4 People v. Gentile, 10 Cal. 5th 830, 842 (2020).  
5 Jessica Pishko, Hundreds Stuck in California Prisons as Prosecutors Seek to Block 
New Law, THE APPEAL (Mar. 25, 2019) https://theappeal.org/hundreds-stuck-in-
prison-in-california-as-prosecutors-seek-to-block-new-law/; see, e.g. “when you’re 
facing life, it’s such a risk to throw the dice and maybe spend rest of your life in 
prison versus when a prosecutor comes at you with a determinate (prison) term,” 
Jenny Brandt, a California-based appeal attorney, said in an interview. She later 
added, “the people who are being offered these deals, it’s not only that they’re less 
culpable but it’s also that there’s less evidence against them”; see also Nate 
Gartrell, ‘Justice is not on my side’: California courts’ interpretation of felony 
murder rule change leaves out people who pleaded to manslaughter, THE MERCURY 
NEWS (Mar. 20, 2021) https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/03/20/ca-felony-
murder-law-change-doesnt-apply-to-people-who-plea-down-courts-rule/. 
6 Cal. S. 1437, supra note 1.  
7 People v. Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 5th 1087 (2019). 
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theory as aider and abettors.  The Note proceeds as follows.  Part I 
analyzes the history of California’s felony murder rule and the natural 
and probable consequences theory.  In particular, I examine the 
implications of felony murder as it has been applied to non-
principals—accomplices and aider and abettors, to the actual 
deterrence of crime. I end Part I with a brief overview the history and 
purpose of SB 1437.  In Part II I directly address specific changes 
made under SB 1437,  and the open question currently before the 
California Supreme Court regarding how SB 1437 has impacted the 
law of attempted murder liability.  Finally, in Part III, I argue that the 
California Supreme Court should hold that attempted murder liability 
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine is inherently 
incorporated into SB 1437.  I conclude by  examining the California 
Legislature’s role in clarifying the boundaries of SB 1437 and 
encouraging action on their behalf to ensure just and fair sentencing. 
  
I. California’s Harsh Punitive Measures under The 
Felony Murder Rule and the Natural and Probable 
Consequences Doctrine 
 
“There is a need for statutory changes to more 
equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their 
involvement in homicides. Reform is needed in 
California to limit convictions and subsequent 
sentencing so that the new law of California fairly 
addresses the culpability of the individual and assists 
in the reductions of prison overcrowding, which 
partially results from lengthy sentences that are not 
commensurate with the culpability of the 
individual.”8 
 
 Under the old felony murder rule, accomplices were sentenced 
uniformly to the person who committed the murder, meaning, they 
could be given life sentences for a killing they neither intended or 
personally committed.  Similarly, under the traditional natural and 
probable consequences doctrine, and aider and abettor could face 
                                                
8 Cal. S. 1437, 1015 § 1(b)(e) (2018).  
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murder and attempted murder liability without sharing the principal’s 
intent. 
A. Felony Murder - California Penal Code § 188 and § 189 
 
 The doctrine of felony murder has long been an outlier in the 
law of homicide.  Generally, in order to be convicted of first or second-
degree murder, the state has to prove the perpetrator had the requisite  
mens rea— or mental state, when committing the crime.9  For murder 
this means showing the person acted with “malice”, which can either 
be “express” or “implied.”10  Express malice is present when someone 
intends to kill whereas malice may be implied where, regardless of an 
individual’s lack of intent to kill, the circumstances attending the 
killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.11  In other words, 
implied malice is “killing someone in a way that demonstrates a 
callous disregard for the value of human life.”12  However, under 
the felony murder rule, codified as Cal. Penal Code § 189, an aider 
and abettor can be charged with murder—even if they neither intended 
to cause the death of another or actually did so—so long as a death 
occurs while in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, certain 
felonies such as arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, 
kidnapping, and others punishable felonies under additional 
sections.13   
Thus, to gain a conviction under the felony murder rule as it 
formerly existed, it did not matter if the defendant did not act with 
express or implied malice.  All the state would have to prove is that 
the aider and abettor participated in one of the listed felonies, and that 
a fatality occurred as a result.  The rationale behind the felony murder 
rule is that certain crimes are inherently dangerous, and society wants 
                                                
9 CALCRIM 520, Penal Code § 187.  
10 Id.  
11 Cal. Penal Code § 188 (a)(2) (2019); see also CALCRIM 520, supra note 9, (“at 
the time he/she acted/[or] failed to act, he/she knew his/her act/[or] failure to act was 
dangerous to human life; and he/she deliberately acted/[or] failed to act with 
conscious disregard for human/ [or] fetal) life”).  
12 Legal Information Institute, Murder, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/murder. 
13 Cal. Penal Code § 189(a) (2017). 
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to deter individuals from engaging in them completely.14  Seen this 
way, the felony murder laws established a kind of strict liability, 
punishing perpetrators for fatalities resulting from the commission of 
certain crimes,15 no matter what the individual’s underlying intent 
was. 
 
B. Aider and Abettor Liability Under the Natural and 
Probable Consequences Doctrine  
 
 Traditionally, under an aider and abettor theory, a defendant 
can be “vicariously” convicted if they assist, encourage, or facilitate a 
crime, even though they are not the actual perpetrator of a particular 
crime against a victim.16  However, they must share the perpetrator’s 
intent to commit that original crime.17  Thus, a defendant can be 
convicted if they knowingly aided a “target” crime, which “naturally 
and foreseeably could have led to a more violent” one.18  The law 
judges the death to be naturally foreseeable when, if viewed 
objectively, it is reasonable to assume that a death could plausibly 
result from the commission of that crime.19  
 In People v. Prettyman, the Supreme Court held that in order 
for a defendant to be convicted under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine20, the jury must decide whether the defendant 
(1) with knowledge of the actual perpetrator’s unlawful purpose; and 
(2) with the intent of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the 
                                                
14 Felony Murder, JUSTIA, 
https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/homicide/felony-murder/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2020).  
15 Please note that the words “target” and “original” are used interchangeably 
throughout this Note.  






19 People v. Medina, 46 Cal. 4th 913, 920 (2009). 
20 CALCRIM 402 (a natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable 
person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes); first Cal. case 
embracing this doctrine was People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331 (1907). 
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commission of any target crime(s); (3) aided, promoted, encouraged, 
or instigated the commission of the target crime(s).21  Further, it is also 
a necessity for the jury to find that (4) the defendant’s partner and main 
principle committed an offense other than the target crime, and (5) the 
offense committed by the principle was a natural and probable 
consequence of the target crime that the defendant aided and abetted.22 
Take, for example, three people who agree to steal a car.  
Person A and B are driven by person C, who stays in the car while A 
and B commit the crime—actually stealing the car.  Person A ends up 
shooting the driver of the car they are attempting to steal without 
person B or C agreeing to it or having planned it beforehand.  Even if, 
hypothetically, the driver survives, Person A may still be liable for an 
attempted murder.  Moreover, although neither B nor C has manifested 
any actual intent to cause the death of another, they may too be liable.  
In this scenario, person B, and even C—who waited in the car, can be 
found guilty and convicted of attempted murder if the “shooting of the 
car owner” was a natural and foreseeable event of the grand theft auto 
in this case.  Under the traditional felony murder rules, the malice of 
Person A would be imputed to Persons B and C. SB 1437 changed 
this, disallowing malice supporting a homicide to be imputed23 to a 
crime participant merely for agreeing to the original crime.  
Moreover, the main difference when being charged as an aider 
and abettor under the felony murder rule versus the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine, prior to SB 1437, is strict liability. 
The felony murder rule has strict liability based on the target felony 
intended to be committed—if it’s one of the listed felonies—whereas 
the natural and probable consequences theory looks at the defendant’s 
level of criminal conduct, surrounding circumstances, and facts and 
then applies an objective standard.  However, this was modified under 
SB 1437.  
 
C. Changes Under Senate Bill 1437 
                                                
21 People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th 248, 262 (1996). 
22 Id.  
23 “The word ‘impute’ ... means to bring into the reckoning, to attribute or to ascribe. 
It is sometimes used to attribute vicariously,—to ascribe as derived from another.’ 
” (BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 908 (11th ed. 2019), quoting PERKINS & BOYCE, 
CRIMINAL LAW 605 (3d ed. 1982)). 
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 SB 1437 was a multiyear effort that commenced in 2016 and 
resulted in reform to the felony murder rules discussed above.24  The 
work behind it was borne out of advocates’ “personal experiences with 
clients, incarcerated individuals and family members with loved ones 
serving life sentences under this antiquated doctrine.”25  Through the 
work of legal advocates and communities impacted by the felony 
murder rules, SB 1437 brought the injustice of the felony murder rule 
into the spotlight for many who were previously unaware of its 
impact.26  In 2017, Senate Concurrent Resolution (SCR) 48 passed 
both houses of the legislature,27 recognizing the need for statutory 
changes to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their 
involvement in the crime.28   Shortly after SCR 48 was passed, 
Democratic Senator Nancy Skinner, authored the bill along with 
Republican Senator, Joel Anderson.29  Senator Skinner called the bill 
a “fair and reasonable fix” to the felony murder law.30  The Bill was 
approved by Governor Brown on September 30, 2018, and went into 
effect January 1, 2019.31 There were some challenges from some 
district attorneys’ offices contending the bill was violation of SB the 
                                                
24 Alexandra Mallick and Kate Chatfield, California Accomplices to a Felony 
Shouldn’t Be Sentence Like the One Who Committed the Murder, JUV. JUST. INFO. 





28 S. Con. Res. 48, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017),   
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SC
R48. 
29 Chatfield & Mallick, supra note 24. (It is important to note that SB 1437 does not 
abolish the felony murder rule. It simply amends it, so that only those who actually 
killed, who aided the killing with the intent to kill, or who acted with reckless 
disregard to human life during the course of the felony may be convicted of murder. 
Under this bill, prosecutors would no longer be able to substitute the intent to commit 
a crime for the intent to commit murder). 
30 Darrell Smith, DAs urge Brown to veto crime bills, calling them ‘serious threats 
to public safety,’ THE SACRAMENTO BEE, (Sep. 
6, 2018),  https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article217893180.html. 
31 S.B. 1437, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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California Constitution, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument and 
upheld its validity.32 
 With the passage of Senate Bill 1437, three separate provisions 
of the Penal Code were amended, two of them being Section 188 and 
189.33  Under section 188, ‘malice’ was redefined. Now, in order to be 
convicted of murder, a principal must act with malice aforethought 
and malice cannot be imputed to a person solely on their participation 
in a crime.34  As courts have construed it, this means that SB 1437 has 
eliminated liability for murder, regardless of the degree, under the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine.35   
                                                
32 See Danielle Silva, Court Upholds SB 1437 Constitutionality after Orange County 
DA Denied Petition Review, DAVIS VANGUARD (Mar. 19, 2020) (“[i]n November 
2019, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One, determined the 
constitutionality of SB 1437 under the People v. Gooden (2019) and People 
v. Lamareoux (2019). Their conclusions were published, allowing them to be used 
in case law. The arguments against SB 1437’s constitutionality stated the bill 
amended two voter-approved laws: Proposition 7, which increased the punishment 
for first- and second-degree murder, and Proposition 115, which expanded the 
definition of first-degree murder to include “murders occurring during the 
commission or attempted commission of kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act 
punishable under sections 286, 288, 288a, or 289.” Two of the three justices that 
heard the oral arguments rejected these arguments. One justice, however, in his 
dissenting opinion stated that Proposition 7 was amended under SB 1437, as the 
elements of a crime and punishment were argued to be closely linked. The District 
Attorney of San Diego, the plaintiff in these cases, filed for a review and de-
publication of the opinion to the California Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, 
however, denied both requests, making the Lamareoux and Gooden decisions the 
current highest standing case law in California.”); see also Alexei Koseff, California 
prosecutors push to overturn new law on who can be guilty of murder, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Jul. 9, 2019) (“[A]cross the state, prosecutors have filed to 
block petitions for resentencing because they believe the new law is 
unconstitutional.”). 
33 S.B. 1437, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
34 S.B. 1437, sec. 2, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). See Cal. Penal Code § 
188, subd. (a)(3). 
35 People v. Gentile, 10 Cal. 5th 830, 847-848 (2020) (“[i]f Senate Bill 1437 were 
inapplicable to second degree murder, there would have been no need to include 
second degree murder among the convictions eligible for relief under section 
1170.95. Apart from the Court of Appeal decision in this case, every published Court 
of Appeal opinion to address the issue has concluded that Senate Bill 1437 
eliminates natural and probable consequences liability for murder regardless of 
degree”).  
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Section 189—which defines first and second degree murder—
was modified to include subdivision (e).36  Under this subdivision, a 
participant in the crimes enumerated in subdivision (a) is liable under 
the felony murder doctrine only if: “(1) the person was the actual 
killer,” (2) the person was not the actual killer but, with the intent to 
kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, 
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the actual commission of 
murder in the first degree, [or] (3) the person was a major participant 
in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human 
life.”37   
 The third provision of SB 1437 is the added Section 1170.95 
to the Penal Code, which makes the amendments to sections 188 and 
189 retroactive to those who were previously convicted and qualify.38  
Section 1170.95 states that if a person has been convicted of felony 
murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, 
they “may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to 
have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced 
on any remaining counts when” certain conditions are met.39  This 
applies to cases where the petitioner was convicted following a trial or 
chose to take a plea deal.40 
 This leads us to what is not specifically mentioned in the text 
of SB 1437, its application to those who were convicted as aiders and 
abettors under the natural and probable consequences doctrine for 
attempted murder, as opposed to murder.  In particular, it is not clear 
from the text whether those convicted under the aforementioned 
doctrine can petition a trial court pursuant to Penal Code § 1170.95 to 
have their murder convictions vacated and be resentenced. SB 1437 
leaves much room for speculation and assumptions on this matter.  The 
cases that will be discussed in the next section deal specifically with 
answering that particular question.   
 
                                                
36 S.B. 1437, sec. 3, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
37 Id.; see Cal. Penal Code § 189, subd. (f), (does not apply to a defendant when the 
victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of his or her duties). 
38 S.B. 1437, sec. 4, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
39 S.B. 1437, sec. 4, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); see Cal. Penal Code § 
1170.95. 
40 Cal. Penal Code § 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).  
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II. Interpretation of Senate Bill 1437 by California’s 
Court of Appeal 
 
 This Part details the major cases and statutes encompassing SB 
1437 and how they intertwine with each other.  In addition, this Part 
further explains the current circuit split in terms  
of attempted murder applicability under SB 1437. Such liability is not 
specifically mentioned in the bill, and the rationales of each Court of 
Appeal underscore the diversity of approaches to this question.   
 
Table 1: Some of the current cases discussed currently considering 
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A. Court of Appeal Cases Declining to Extend SB 1437 
 
  Before  SB 1437 was enacted, dealing with the culpability of 
aiders and abettors was before the Supreme Court of California 
pending review.  That case, People v. Mateo, presented the question, 
whether, to convict an aider and abettor of attempted willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated murder under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine, a premeditated attempt to murder had to have 
been a natural and probable consequence of the target offense.41  Many 
other cases were pending on that decision.  The appeal in People v. 
Lopez, was originally deferred pending the consideration of the related 
issue in Mateo.  Before Mateo could be heard, SB 1437 was enacted, 
and the Supreme Court of California transferred the Lopez’ case—and 
others similar—back to the Courts of Appeal instructing them to 
vacate their decision and reconsider it in light of SB 1437.42   However, 
the Court in Lopez held that Lopez’s attempted murder conviction was 
unimpacted by SB 1437 when it reconsidered the case.  
The appellants in Lopez, Janeth Lopez and Ivy Navarrete, were 
convicted at trial of second degree murder and attempted premeditated 
murder in 2015.43  Their associate shot and killed one of the victims 
while injuring the second victim as they participated in an act of 
vandalism—spraying graffiti on a wall.44  Both Lopez and Navarrate 
were not the principals;45 Lopez sprayed graffiti along with the 
                                                
41 People v. Mateo, 2019 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 4576 at *1.  
42 Lopez, supra note 7 at 1092.  
43 Id. at 1097. 
44 Id. at 1091. 
45 Id. 
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principal, and Navarrate was the driver.46  Their convictions were 
established under the natural and probable consequences doctrine 
based on the underlying felony and that it was committed for the 
benefit of a street gang.47  
 In 2019, Lopez and Navarrete urged a Court of Appeal in the 
Second District to “extend the legislation’s ameliorative provisions to 
their convictions for attempted premeditated murder.”48  The Court 
began its analysis noting that any case which involves statutory 
interpretation requires the fundamental task of determining the 
Legislature’s intent for the court accomplish the law’s purpose.49 
Because where statutory language is unambiguous, there is a 
presumption that the Legislature meant what it said,50  the Court found 
nothing ambiguous in the language of SB 1437. Rather, the Court 
noted that there’s an omission of any reference to attempted murder 
and clearly identifies its purpose as the need.51  Additionally, they 
stated that if the “Legislature meant to include “attempts” among 
covered offenses, it could have easily done so and that “an attempt is 
an offense ‘separate’ and ‘distinct’ from the completed crime.”52   
 The decision was appealed, and the Supreme Court of 
California granted review on November 13, 2019.53  The Court limited 
the issues to be briefed and argued to the following: (1) Does Senate 
Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) apply to attempted murder 
liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine? and 
(2) In order to convict an aider and abettor of attempted willful, 
deliberate and premeditated murder under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine, must a premeditated attempt to murder have 
                                                
46 Id. at 1092. 
47 Id. at 1097. 
48 Id. at 1103. 
49 Id. at 1103-04; see People v. Scott, 58 Cal. 4th 1415, 1421 (2014) (“As in any case 
involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the 
Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.”).  
50 Lopez, supra note 7 at 1104; see People v. Hudson, 38 Cal. 4th 1002, 1009 (2006) 
(if language is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute controls). 
51 Lopez, supra note 7 at 1104. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1087. 
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been a natural and probable consequence of the target offence?54  A 
hearing date on the merits is yet to be scheduled.  Lopez is the first 
petition where review was granted on this matter.   
 Shortly after Lopez was heard in the Court of Appeal, Second 
District, a similar case was also decided in the same district but in a 
different Division.55  In People v. Munoz, Munoz was convicted, 
following a jury trial, of two counts of premeditated attempted 
murder.56  The conviction was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal and 
then appealed to the Supreme Court of California.  As in Lopez, further 
action was pending decision on Mateo and the Supreme Court of 
California transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal, where they 
reaffirmed the conviction once again.57 The Court of Appeal again 
held that SB 1437 only applies to persons convicted of murder, not 
attempted murder.58   
As in Lopez, the Munoz Court explained that it must start by 
examining the statute’s words, which are given the usual and ordinary 
meaning and if there’s no ambiguity, then plain meaning of the 
statutory language controls and they look no further.59  The Court held 
that they “do not find the statute ambiguous. It expressly identifies the 
offense within its scope, all of which are completed offenses. Had the 
legislature meant to include attempts among the covered offenses, it 
could have easily done so.”60  Additionally, they mention that their 
“colleagues in Division Seven recently came to the same conclusion,” 
referring to the Lopez case.  Munoz appealed the Court of Appeal 
decision and the California Supreme Court granted review on 
                                                
54 People v. Lopez, 451 P.3d 777 (Cal. 2019) (regarding second question to be 
argued) (“In other words, should People v. Favor, 54 Cal. 4th 868 (2012), be 
reconsidered in light of Alleyne v. United States 570 U.S. 99, 133 (2013) and People 
v. Chiu 59 Cal. 4th 155, 172 (2014)?”). 
55 The Second District Court of Appeal is made up of eight Divisions of 
four Justices each; About The 2nd District, CAL. CTS., THE JUD. BRANCH OF 
CAL., https://www.courts.ca.gov/2127.htm#:~:text=It%20is%20now%20made%20
up,the%20Los%20Angeles%20Superior%20Court.  
56 People v. Munoz, 39 Cal. App. 5th 738, 742 (2019).  
57 Id. at 743.  
58 Id. at 751. 
59 Id. at 753. 
60 Id. at 754.  
  
165 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 2:2] 
 
November 26, 2019, further action deferred pending consideration and 
disposition of Lopez’s case.61    
 
 
B. Court of Appeal Cases Extending SB 1437 to Include 
Attempted Murder Convictions 
 
In yet another similar case that was decided soon after Munoz, 
the Court of Appeal took a different approach.  In People v. Medrano, 
the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that SB 1437 was applicable to 
attempted murder.62  In that case, the defendant, Mr. Medrano, was 
found guilty after a jury trial of attempted murder (along with other 
crimes) under the natural and probable consequence of aiding and 
abetting an assault likely to cause bodily harm.63  The California 
Supreme Court had also granted review to Mr. Medrano, pending 
Mateo, but as it did in Lopez and Munoz, returned the case to the Fifth 
District Court of Appeal with directions to vacate their opinion and 
reconsider in light of SB 1437.  When the Fifth District heard the case, 
it took a different approach than the Second District Court of Appeal.  
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that SB 1437 precludes any 
imposition of vicarious liability under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine if the charged offense requires malice 
aforethought.64  They reasoned that the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine is no longer a viable theory of accomplice 
liability for attempted murder since malice can no longer be imputed 
to a defendant who aids and abets a target offense without the intent 
to kill.65  “We acknowledge two of our sister courts have held Senate 
Bill 1437 does not affect the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine as it related to attempted murder.  However, we respectfully 
disagree with their analysis and conclusions…”66   
 The Court of Appeal gave various reasons for the disagreement 
with their sister courts. First, they disagreed with the Lopez decision 
                                                
61 Munoz, supra note 56 at 742. 
62 People v. Medrano, 42 Cal. App. 5th 1001, 1013 (2019). 
63 Id. at 1007. 
64 Id. at 1013. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
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which held that, although SB 1437 eliminates aider and abettor 
liability for murder under the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine, “the imposition of vicarious liability for attempted murder 
under the same doctrine is not based on imputed malice.”67  Second, 
the Medrano Court was not persuaded by Lopez’s reliance on the 
absence of “attempted murder” language in SB 1437.68  They reason 
that the omission is meaningless considering that Penal Code sections 
187, 188, and 189 have also never included that term, yet, these 
statutes together coupled with Penal Code section 21a—which 
explains the law of attempt—are the basis for all attempted murder 
convictions.69  Third, they discuss the amended section 188 under SB 
1437 which states that “malice shall not be imputed to a person based 
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” The Medrano court 
reasoned that the omission of specific reference to attempted murder 
prosecutions was immaterial, as the Penal Code was clear that malice 
may not be imputed by the commission of another crime, and makes 
no exceptions for attempted murder which undeniably requires 
express malice—"synonymous with the intent to kill.”70   
The Medrano Court held that the Legislature’s failure to 
exclude attempted murder from section 188 means they intended for 
the provisions to apply to all crimes that require express malice 
because they could have easily said, “Except for attempted murder, 
malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her 
participation in a crime.”71  Inclusively, they point to Section 188 
where “except” appears in the previous sentence to exclude felony-
murder prosecutions from the scope of the provision.72  “When the 
Legislature ‘has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded 
it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ”73  
Consequently, Medrano’s attempted murder conviction was reversed.  
The State of California appealed decision and the California Supreme 
                                                
67 Id. at 1014. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. (“An attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: a specific intent to 
commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.”). 
70 Id. at 1014-1015. 
71 Id. at 1015.  
72 Medrano, supra note 62 at 1013; see Cal. Penal Code §188(a)(3).  
73 Medrano, supra note 62 at 1015.  
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Court granted review on March 11, 2020, also pending Lopez’s 
decision.74 
 In March 2020, in People v. Sanchez, a different panel of the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal sided and agreed with the court’s 
holding in Medrano and reversed Sanchez’ conviction.75  Sanchez was 
convicted of attempted murder after an acquaintance fired a shotgun 
during an altercation with other men.76  The prosecutor in that case 
argued that Sanchez should be convicted for directly aiding and 
abetting the shooter and alternatively, that the attempted murder was 
a natural and probable consequence of an assault with a firearm.77   
During the appeal, the Court specifically said they agreed with 
the analysis in Medrano—"under statutory construction principles, 
malice imputing prohibition applies to attempted murder” and 
disagreed with Munoz and Lopez.78  In addition to the principles of 
statutory construction discussed above, the Court relied on public 
policy reasoning to reach their conclusion that SB 1437 applies to 
attempted murder.  “Limiting SB 1437’s malice imputing prohibition 
to murder has the absurd consequences of incentivizing murder.”79  
The court reasoned that a necessary principle of statutory construction 
should not give the language of the statute a literal meaning if doing it 
would bring about absurd consequences.80  As in Medrano, this case 
was also granted review by the California Supreme Court, pending 
Lopez’s decision.81  
 Since SB 1437 went into effect, many more petitions have 
been filed for resentencing of attempted murder convictions based on 
aiding and abetting theory under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine.82  Currently, more than 80 cases have been 
                                                
74 Id. at 1013. 
75 People v. Sanchez, 46 Cal. App. 5th 637, 642 (2020). 
76 Id. at 639. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 643.  
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 643. See also People v. Cook, 60 Cal. 4th 922, 929-30 (2015) (a fundamental 
principle of statutory construction is that the language of a statute should not be 
given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences). 
81 Sanchez, supra note 75 at 642. 
82 Central California Appellate Program, Murder--SB 1437's Application to 
Attempted Murder Liability Under the NPC Doctrine and Aider and Abettor 
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granted review83 and are all pending the Supreme Court of California 
decision once it hears the Lopez case.  Responding to the circuit split 
on the question of SB 1437’s applicability to attempted murder 
convictions, many others have stepped into the debate.84  
 
III. Basic Principles of Statutory Construction as Well as 
Fundamental Fairness Require that Attempted 
Murder be Incorporated Into Senate Bill 1437. 
 
 The fundamental principle cited above, “that a person should 
be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level of 
individual culpability,” demand that SB 1437’s proscription on 
imputing malice based on the participation in another crime be 
extended to attempted murder convictions.  First, and most 
importantly, the ambiguities in the reforms demand that legislature 
should act.85  An amendment to the law explicitly laying out that there 
can no longer be convictions for natural and probable consequences 
attempted murder as an aider and abettor, prior to the California 
Supreme Court hearing on People v. Lopez (hearing date still pending) 
would most directly address the current debate.  Secondly, regardless 
of whether the legislature steps in, the Supreme Court of California 
should rule that attempted murder liability under the natural and 
                                                
Liability, https://www.capcentral.org/high_court/casedetails?id=742 (last updated 
Mar. 24, 2021). 
83 Id. 
84 See J. Bradley O’Connell, S.B. 1437 – Reformation of Murder Liability Promises 
and Perils, FIRST DISTRICT APP. PROJECT (Jan. 2020), https://www.fdap.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/SB_1437.pdf; Aileen Chinchilla, Attempted Murder to 
apply under the SB 1437 new law, https://www.change.org/p/gavin-newsom-
attempted-murder-to-apply-under-the-sb-1437-new-law (last visited May 4, 
2021); Nate Gartrell, ‘Justice is not on my side’: California courts; interpretation of 
felony murder rule change leaves out people who pleaded to manslaughter, THE 
MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 20, 2021), https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/03/20/ca-
felony-murder-law-change-doesnt-apply-to-people-who-plea-down-courts-
rule/; Alex Rifkin, Unconstitutionally Redefining Murder: CA Legislature takes a 
significant overstep with S.B. 1437, GGU LAW REVIEW BLOG (Oct. 14, 
2019), https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1066&cont
ext=ggu_law_review_blog.  
85 Branches of the U.S. Gov’t, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-
government (last visited May 4, 2021). 
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probable consequences doctrine is no longer a possibility if predicated 
under “imputed malice” because of it remains in the ambit of SB 1437.  
In other words, the Court should affirm the Fifth District’s analysis 
that attempted murder—not just murder—also falls under SB 1437.  
Failure to do so will only incentivize murder and is contradictory to 
crime deterrence and just and fair punishment in general.  
 
A. The California Legislature Should Act to Modify 
Senate Bill 1437 to Explicitly Include Attempted 
Murder 
  
 Currently, there are two ways to ensure attempted murder 
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine is covered under 
SB 1437, through statute or through the courts. As the representative 
branch of government, it is presumed that legislation represents the 
voices of the people.86  In passing SB 1437, the legislature stepped 
into the complex law surrounding imputed malice and felony murder.  
Therefore, SB 1437 and its application to attempted murder should be 
clarified through those representatives to forestall potential abrogation 
of that law from the California Supreme Court.  This is not meant to 
diminish the role of the courts in determining these issues, but rather, 
to allow the ultimate decision to fall on the people vis-a-vis legislation.  
Further, even if the California Supreme Court were to hear the case 
prior to the Legislature stepping in, Legislative action may still be 
necessary to  ensure the proscriptions of SB 1437 are codified in the 
penal code instead of case precedent, since the latter can ultimately 
change.87  The legislature should step in to be clear the elimination of 
                                                
86 See NATL. CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA: VOICES OF THE PEOPLE, https://www.ncsl.org/legislators-
staff/legislators/trust-for-representative-democracy/representative-democracy-in-
america-voices-of-the-people.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2021); See also U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, ABOUT THE UNITED 
STATES, https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/civic-assimilation/resources-for-new-
lawful-permanent-residents/about-the-united-states (last updated Jul. 20, 2020) 
(“The United States is a representative democracy and its people play an important 
role in the governing process.”). 
87 CORNELL LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION 
INSTITUTE, PRECEDENT, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/precedent (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2021) (“Precedent refers to a court decision that is considered as 
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the use of imputed malice should apply to convictions for attempted 
murder, as well as those for felony murder.88  Such an act would serve 
to make permanent a decision by the Supreme Court expanding SB 
1437 to attempted murder liability and, if it does not, would serve to 
clarify the legislatures ultimate intent on the issue.89 
 When SB 1437 was enacted, the Legislature stated that there 
is a “bedrock principle of the law and of equity that a person should 
be punished  for his or her actions according to his or her own level of 
individual culpability.”90  It also stated that California needed reform 
in limiting convictions to fairly address the culpability of the 
individual and thus, support the reduction of prison overcrowding—
partly coming from lengthy sentences which are not proportionate to 
                                                
authority for deciding subsequent cases involving identical or similar facts, or 
similar legal issues. Precedent is incorporated into the doctrine of stare decisis and 
requires courts to apply the law in the same manner to cases with the same facts. 
Some judges have stated that precedent ensures that individuals in similar situations 
are treated alike instead of based on a particular judge’s personal views”).   
88 CORNELL LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, COMMON 
LAW, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/common_law (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) 
(“[a]t the state level, legislatures often subsequently codify common law rules from 
the courts of their state, either to give the rule the permanence afforded by a 
statute, to modify it somehow (by either expanding or restricting the scope of the 
common law rule, for example) or to replace the outcome entirely with legislation”).  
89 Id. (“[a]n example that gained national attention was the 2018 California Supreme 
Court decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, which 
articulated a three-part test for determining whether California workers were 
independent contractors or employees for purposes of California labor law. The 
California Legislature responded by creating a new section of the Labor 
Code, 2750.3, which codified and expanded on the Dynamex holding and went into 
effect on January 1, 2020); see also Ricardo Aranda, AB 5-California Legislature 
Weighs in on the Dynamex Decision Regarding California Independent 
Contractors, SAN JOAQUIN BAR ASSN. (Jan. 3, 2021), https://www.sjcbar.org/news-
index/ab-5-california-legislature-weighs-in-on-the-dynamex-decision-regarding-
california-independent-contractors (“AB 5 is the Legislature’s response 
to Dynamex, and actually confirms that the ABC test is “the law of the land” when 
deciding whether an individual is an employee or contractor. AB 5 codifies the ABC 
test articulated in Dynamex…”); HANSON BRIDGETT LABOR & EMPLOYMENT 
PRACTICE, SB 327 RENDERS GERARD V. ORANGE COAST MEDICAL CENTER 
MOOT (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.hansonbridgett.com/Publications/articles/2015-
10-12-labor-employment_sb327-gerard-v-orange?pdf=1.  
90 CA Senate Bill No. 1437, Stats. 2018, Ch. 1015, Sec. 1, subd. (d).  
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the actual culpability of the individual.91  Though the law enacted does 
not explicitly mention attempted murder in the revisions of Penal Code 
sections 188 and 189, the legislative intent is clear based the principles 
stated in Section 1 of the statute.92  If a person is to be punished based 
on their own level of culpability, it would be irrational for someone to 
argue that attempted murder is not a lesser crime than murder.  Thus, 
for someone to contend that SB 1437 only applies to cases in which 
an actual murder resulted, is absurd, and contrary to the clear intent of 
the legislature.  Further, when SB 1437 was being drafted, this issue 
was not anticipated, as mentioned by one of the legislative lead 
drafters, Kate Chatfield, and discussed more in detail in the following 
section.93  
 
B. The Supreme Court of California Should Hold that 
Senate Bill 1437 Is Applicable to Attempted Murder 
 
 Due to the omission of “attempted murder” in sections 188 and 
189 under SB 1437, courts have been split as to the ultimate impact of 
the SB 1437 legislation since its 2019 effective date.94   As mentioned 
earlier, the California Supreme Court has granted review to Lopez, and 
many others, to address this particular issue.95  In light of this, I 
maintain that the Court should hold that SB 1437 applies to attempted 
murder liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine 
based on legislative intent,96  principles of criminal liability, and 
fundamental equity.    
                                                
91 CA Senate Bill No. 1437, Stats. 2018, Ch. 1015, Sec. 1, subd. (e). 
92 CA Senate Bill No. 1437, Stats. 2018, Ch. 1015, Sec. 1, subd. (b) (to effect 
“statutory changes to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their 
involvement in homicides”).  
93 Telephone interview with Kate Chatfield, Dir. of Pol’y, The Justice Collaborative 
(Oct. 13, 2020); see THE JUSTICE COLLABORATIVE, 
https://thejusticecollaborative.com/team/kate-chatfield/. 
94 CA Senate Bill No. 1437, Stats. 2018, Ch. 1015.  
95 Lopez, supra note 54. 
96 Legislative Intent, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Legislative_intent (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2021) (“Legislative intent is a practice used by judges, lawyers and 
other court officials to determine the goals of legislators at the time of a bill's 
passage. This practice involves reviewing the plain language of a legislative act as 
well as debate transcripts, available drafts and committee notes related to the act. 
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 For cases involving statutory interpretation, the court has to 
determine the Legislature’s intent to effectuate the law’s purpose.97  In 
another case where the California Supreme Court discussed statutory 
interpretation, People v. Cook, they went further.98  The Court 
mentioned that “a fundamental principle of statutory construction is 
that the language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if 
doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature 
did not intent.99  With that in mind, let’s analyze SB 1437. 
 Though attempted murder is not explicitly mentioned, the 
intent of the legislature and purpose was very direct in Section I, to 
fairly address disproportionate punishments meted out under an 
imputed malice theory and render punishment appropriate for an 
individual’s level of culpability.100  The act  removed “malice” from 
being attributed to a person solely on their participation in a crime, 
thus, pointing to the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a 
defunct theory to prove accomplice liability for attempted murder.101  
Moreover, by this standard, it is irrational to impute a harsher 
punishment to the perpetrator when the victim does not succumb to 
their injuries and survives than when they do.  Further, when speaking 
to Kate Chatfield—the lead drafter and organizer for SB 1437, she 
agreed.102    
 On October 13, 2020 I spoke with Kate Chatfield, one of the 
drafters of SB 1437, via telephone to ask for some clarity on the 
purpose and intent of SB 1437.103  She mentioned that she was a law 
student when she heard about the felony murder rule and thought it 
was not right, which sparked her interest in pursuing the issue years 
                                                
The use of more detailed research into legislative intent can stem from vague or 
general language that does not address the matter at hand”).  
97 People v. Gonzalez, 2 Cal. 5th 1138, 1141 (2017) (“As in any case involving 
statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature's 
intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. We begin by examining the statute's 
words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning”). 
98 People v. Cook, 60 Cal. 4th 922 (2015). 
99 Id. at 927. 
100 CA Senate Bill No. 1437, Stats. 2018, Ch. 1015, Sec. 1. 
101 See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 74 at 637. 
102 Telephone interview with Kate Chatfield, Dir. of Pol’y, The Just. Collaborative 
(Oct. 13, 2020). 
103 Id.  
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later.104  When asked whether SB 1437 intended to include attempted 
murder and if so, why was it not included in the statute language, she 
responded that at that time, People v. Mateo had already been granted 
review by the  California Supreme Court and that those involved in 
the drafting of SB 1437 anticipated that attempted murder under the 
natural and probable consequences theory would be eliminated.105  
This expectation was based on theory that when legislation for a 
greater crime passes, the lesser crime does not exist anymore.106  She 
said they did not imagine that the CA Supreme Court would transfer 
the case back to the Court of Appeal in light of SB 1437 for 
reconsideration instead of addressing it first.107  Chatfield expressed 
that she finds it absurd for someone to get a greater sentence when a 
victim remains alive than when they do not.108  She also said she hopes 
the Supreme Court of California rules in Lopez’ favor—for attempted 
murder to be included under SB 1437 and that if not, believes the 
Legislature will.109 
 Further, fundamental justice for those most impacted by 
California’s felony murder laws requires that SB 1437 be applied to 
attempted murder convictions. Two family members of people 
currently incarcerated, whose convictions were based on the natural 
and probable consequences theory for attempted murder, share the 
same sentiments as Kate Chatfield.110  One said, “I am baffled by the 
fact that courts really do not think SB 1437 should apply to attempted 
murder when it applies to a higher crime.  It makes no sense to think 
that my son would be home if the victim had been killed.”111 The other 
family member said she really hopes the California Supreme Court 
will see how absurd it will be for SB 1437 not to apply.112 
                                                
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
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 The Court of Appeal in the Second and Fifth District ruled on 
this specific issue and yielded different results.  The Second District 
has opted to exclude attempted murder under the SB 1437 authority.113  
However, two distinct Court of Appeal’s in the Fifth District have 
done the exact opposite.114  In analyzing all pertinent cases, the Fifth 
District’s decision broadly interpreting SB 1437 has the better 
argument.  The argument in Munoz contends that an attempted murder 
charge could be punished with a sentence lengthier than that of one 
imposed on a person with a murder charge. Such an outcome 
disregards the actual homicide as a real threat and diminishes the 
gravity of it.  It is not merely a hypothetical, but a reality.115 As stated 
in Sanchez, “limiting SB 1437’s malice inputting prohibition to 
murder has the absurd consequence of incentivizing murder.”   
 Moreover, standard criminal liability notions for murder and 
attempted murder demand that attempted murder is included in the 
legislation.  “An attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: 
a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act 
done toward its commission.”116  Thus, an attempted crime requires 
the same mens rea, minimum, as the target offense and the penalties 
for attempt and completed acts are also often the same.  Which 
reinforces the position to have the attempted crime included. Or else, 
as mentioned earlier, it incentivizes murder.   
 If the California Supreme Court holds that attempted murder 
does not apply under SB 1437 in the aider and abettor theory, it will 
propagate the irrational consequence of incentivizing murder.  It is 
nonsensical for someone to be “incentivized” to ensure that their 
victim die in order for them to qualify for a better sentencing 
probability under this statute.  “If this position is correct, then a 
criminal defendant's liability turns inversely on the victim's 
fortunes.”117  Taking into account the doctrine’s deterrence rationale, 
                                                
113 Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 5th at 1103; Munoz, 39 Cal. App. 5th 738. 
114 Sanchez, 46 Cal. App. 5th at 637; Medrano, 42 Cal. App. 5th at 1015.  
115 Munoz, 39 Cal. App. 5th 738. 
116 CAL. PENAL CODE § 21a. 
117 Sanchez, 46 Cal. App. 5th at 643-44 (“A sophisticated and sinister criminal street 
gang would understand that ensuring a victim's death reduces the gang's liability as 
a whole. While the pros and cons of eliminating the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine's application to murder are debatable, incentivizing murder 
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the absurd consequence is counterintuitive to the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine.118 Such an absurd outcome cannot be 
consistent with legislative intent, or fundamental justice for the 
countless individuals currently serving sentences as an accomplice to 




 In this Note, I argue that the applicability of SB 1437 
encompasses or should extend to those convicted of attempted murder 
under the natural and probable consequences theory as aider and 
abettors.  Part I analyzed the history of the felony murder rule and the 
natural and probable consequence theory in California.  Specifically, 
how it applies to accomplices, aider and abettors and expanded 
discussion on principles of crime and punishment as it pertains to 
crime deterrence. It also explained the history and purpose of SB 1437.  
In Part II, I discussed specific law changes made under Senate Bill 
1437.  This included a breakdown of the current cases and circuit split 
debating whether attempted murder liability is covered under the 
changes made in SB 1437.  In Part III, my analysis, I argued that the 
Supreme Court of California should hold that attempted murder 
liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine is 
inherently incorporated into SB 1437.  In other words, the Court 
should side with the decisions held in the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal.  Additionally, I urge and encourage action from California 
Legislators to clarify SB 1437—reflecting my argument—to ensure 








                                                
is an undoubtedly absurd consequence of abrogating its applicability to murder but 
not attempted murder.”). 
118 Id. at 644. 
